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Debt Relief and Development: The Case of the 2005 
Debt Relief Agreement in Nigeria    
        
In 1999 Nigeria became a democracy again after a long period 
of dictatorship. One of the top priorities for the newly elected 
President Obasanjo was to clear the huge foreign debt that the 
country had built up  in previous decades. Most of this debt was 
with bilateral official creditors, united in the so-called Paris Club.1 
But debt relief to Nigeria was controversial. Although the country 
has a low income, it has large oil reserves with which it should be 
able to pay its debt. Furthermore, the country is notorious for its 
corruption and for irresponsible economic policies. 
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Nevertheless, in 2005 Nigeria and the 
creditors Club reached an agreement on 
the US$ 30 billion debt with the Paris Club. 
The creditors cancelled US$ 18 billion, and 
Nigeria repaid US$ 12 billion. Most of the 
US$ 18 billion was registered as aid, justi-
fying the question whether the cancellation 
contributed to development in Nigeria. A 
team of consultants linked to Ecorys and 
OPM carried out this evaluation for two of 
the creditors involved, namely the evalua-
tion departments of the Dutch and Belgian 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs.2 Much to 
everybody’s surprise, we concluded that the 
debt deal did contribute to Nigeria’s growth 
and poverty reduction. 
 
Tracing the effects
We followed a theory-based evaluation me-
thodology. According to theory, debt relief 
may have an impact on economic growth 
through a reduction in debt service flows or 
a reduction in the debt stock. A reduction in 
debt service flows may make more money 
available for government investment in so-
cial services or in physical investment, which 
in turn may lead to improvements in the 
well-being of the population and to higher 
incomes. A reduction of an unsustainable 
debt stock may lead to a return of investor 
confidence in the economy, as possible fo-
reign and domestic investors no longer need 
to fear that their profits will be taxed away 
in order to pay-off the government debt. A 
third possible effect of effect debt relief is 
through the conditions that are usually at-
tached to it. If these were good conditions 
and if they are implemented, this may also 
lead to higher economic growth and more 
poverty reduction.
A first step in the evaluation is therefore to 
assess whether the 2005 debt relief agree-
ment led to a reduction in debt service and 
debt stock. We needed to know to what 
extent Nigeria would have paid this debt if 
there would not have been an agreement 
on debt relief. Due to a rising oil price from 
2003 onward, Nigeria was economically 
able to pay the full amount of debt service 
due of around US$ 3 billion. However, servi-
cing this debt was politically difficult. Many 
people felt that the debt was illegitimate, 
having grown so much due to irresponsible 
dictators in the past. After interviewing 
many stakeholders, we concluded that 
most likely the country would have paid 
only US$ 1 billion a year: one-third of the 
amount due, but just enough to main-
tain some relation with the creditors. This 
means that in the absence of an agree-
ment, the debt stock would have continued 
to increase with the amounts due and not 
paid, plus the interest on these non-paid 
amounts. While Nigeria’s actual foreign 
debt stock declined from US$ 34 to US$ 4 
billion (only 2% of GDP), without the debt 
deal it would have risen to US$ 54 billion.
With respect to the debt service flow the 
situation was different. Nigeria had to pay 
US$ 12 billion up front as part of the agree-
ment. This was much more than the US$ 
1 billion annually that it would have paid 
otherwise. Yet, because the country was 
able to pay the US$ 12 billion from accumu-
lated reserves, the US$ 1 billion in forgone 
annual debt service was felt as “savings”.
There were clear conditions attached to 
the debt relief agreement with Nigeria, 
and they were very effective, especially 
before the agreement but also to some 
extent after it. When President Obasanjo 
began to talk about debt cancellation, the 
creditors made it clear that changes in 
economic policies were necessary, first (in 
the early 2000s, The UK and the US made 
some specific promises: if Nigeria was to 
reform its economic policies and to reduce 
its level of corruption, they were willing to 
champion debt relief with the other Paris 
Club creditors). In his first term, not much 
happened in this respect. But when Presi-
dent Obasanjo was re-elected in 2003, he 
appointed a new economic management 
team headed by former World Bank director 
Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala. This team imple-
mented many policy reforms. It no longer 
immediately spent the extra income from 
a higher than expected oil price, but began 
to save it on an excess crude account. It also 
improved debt management, implemented 
anti-corruption policies, cleaned the ban-
king sector and improved poverty reduction 
policies.
The Paris Club deal itself was accompanied 
by a two-year IMF programme. The policy 
conditions of this agreement were based 
on the government’s own programme. But 
we found that the bi-annual monitoring 
by the IMF helped to maintain strict fiscal 
and monetary targets and also to keep the 
earlier started reform programme on track. 
The debt deal was also accompanied by a 
government promise to use the US$ 1 billion 
in saved debt service for a “Virtual Poverty 
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Fund” (VPF). This Fund came into being and 
it meant additional spending on essential 
social services, albeit somewhat lower 
than the US$ 1 billion. Ministries and state 
governments could apply for this money 
according to strict procedures and on the 
basis of matching. As a result, the VPF had 
a positive impact on the capacities for 
planning and implementing social projects 
beyond the VPF money itself. 
Results
All in all, the debt relief agreement had 
several positive effects on the economy. 
First, the external debt became very sus-
tainable and this, together with improved 
macro-economic policies, restored investor 
confidence. In 2006 Nigeria obtained its 
first ever credit rating from Fitch in 2006, 
later followed by the same BB-minus 
from Standard and Poor’s. Foreign direct 
investment increased. And while before 
2005 most of this investment was directed 
to the oil sector, substantial amounts were 
now also invested in other sectors such 
as telecommunication and banking. The 
more prudent macro-economic policies 
made it possible for Nigeria to pay the US$ 
12 billion up front and also reduced infla-
tion. In addition, the accumulated savings 
helped to cushion the effects of the world 
wide recession in 2008-2009. 
It is difficult to 
investigate the 
effect of the 
debt relief on growth 
directly, but we know 
from theory that lower 
inflation, improved investor 
confidence and more 
foreign investment all have 
a positive influence. 
It is difficult to investigate the effect of 
the debt relief on growth directly, but we 
know from theory that lower inflation, 
improved investor confidence and more 
foreign investment all have a positive 
influence. In the period 2003-2009, eco-
nomic growth was high, around 7% on 
average. Another indication for an effect 
of the debt deal is that from 2004 onward, 
the growth in the non-oil sectors was 
higher than in the oil sector. Growth was 
also particularly high in the agricultural 
sector, probably implying that the poor 
also benefited. Economic growth, together 
with improved policies from 2003 onward, 
probably also had a positive effect on 
some social indicators. Between 2004 and 
2009, primary school enrolment rates and 
the proportion of births attended by a skil-
led health worker increased, while infant 
mortality decreased.
Sustainability
An important question was also whether 
the positive results are sustainable over 
the medium term. The answer is mixed. 
The IMF programme only covered the 
years 2005-2007 and already during this 
period the discipline to maintain macro-
economic prudence and to continue 
implementing other reforms gradually 
waned. Telling was also that the leader 
of the economic management team was 
removed from her position in 2007 and 
went back to Washington - to return after 
the 2011 elections. While in 2008 and 2009 
it was justified to use the accumulated 
savings for stimulating the economy in 
the context of the global recession, this 
was no longer the case in 2010 when the 
Nigerian economy recovered strongly. Yet, 
politicians continued to deplete the oil sa-
vings account. The institutions established 
for fighting corruption are still there, but 
appear to be less active than before. This 
is also reflected in a slight deterioration 
of Nigeria’s ranking in the Transparency 
Index, after years of gradual improvement. 
On the other hand, the Virtual Poverty 
Fund still exists and can be expected to 
continue fostering Nigeria’s achievement 
of the Millennium Development Goals.
Conclusion 
The development effects of the Nigerian 
debt relief were far more positive than in 
many other countries. One of the reasons 
was that the Nigerian debt was eliminated 
completely so that the country could really 
make a fresh start. But the effect of the 
conditions was also stronger than else-
where, especially before the agreement. 
The country wanted the debt relief badly 
and was willing to undertake far-reaching 
reforms. Even if not all of these policy 
changes can be sustained, the debt deal 
already had positive effects on the welfare 
of the more than 150 million people in 
Nigeria.
The full report can be accessed here: 
http://diplomatie.belgium.be/nl/binaries/1_
IOB_nr_340_Main_report_EN_tcm314-
140813.pdf
Notes
1. The Paris Club is an informal group of 
official bilateral creditors that negoti-
ates collectively on debt restructuring 
with debtor countries.
2. IOB and SEO, “Mutual interests - 
mutual benefits: An evaluation of the 
2005 debt relief agreement between 
the Paris Club and  Nigeria”, main 
report, 2011. The authors were Geske 
Dijkstra (team leader), Christian Hid-
dink, Bola Akanji, Sanga Sangarabalan,  
and François-Xavier de Mévius. 
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